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The Micro-Politics of a New Mental Condition:
Legitimization in Maladaptive Daydreamers' Discourse
Orit Bershtling and Eli Somer
University of Haifa, Israel
This study illuminates legitimization efforts in the discourse of individuals who
suffer from excessive, uncontrolled daydreaming: a contested mental condition
that has not yet been recognized by the medical establishment. It aims to explore
the rhetorical maneuvers employed by these “Maladaptive Daydreamers” in 35
email exchanges with the second author and two petitions, submitted to the
American Psychiatric Association and to the UK Parliament, with a demand for
recognition. Our analysis, anchored theoretically and methodologically in
Critical Discourse Analysis, identified several verbal strategies employed by
the participants to persuade their interlocutors about the realness of their
suffering. The main strategies were clustered into three dimensions: (1)
professional—appealing to the audience’s professional identity as scientistpractitioner and presenting shared knowledge; (2) social—forming a joint
consensus group, a coalition or a partnership; (3) psychological—appealing to
the interlocutor’s emotions through gratitude, self-disclosure or humor. This
bottom-up analysis, positions individuals’ claims as a starting point for
knowledge-dissemination and institutional change and blurs the modern
dichotomy between the objects and subjects of medical gaze. Keywords:
Maladaptive Daydreaming, Medicalization, Discourse, Legitimization,
Rhetoric

Introduction
In this article we focus on the voice of “lay” people who suffer from a contested
syndrome and on their struggle for recognition and legitimation. “Maladaptive Daydreaming”
(MD) is an absorptive and compulsive fantasy activity that causes distress because it interferes
with social, academic, interpersonal or vocational functioning (Somer, 2002). The phenomenon
was recently described as an excessive form of immersive daydreaming that produces not only
a rewarding experience based on a created fantasy of a parallel reality, but also dysfunctionality
and distress associated with persistent and recurrent fantasizing activity (Somer, Somer, &
Jopp, 2016a). Internet users around the world have adopted this relatively new term to facilitate
communication, confer collective identity and give meaning to their mutually distressing
condition. Still, the existence of MD has yet to be acknowledged by the medical and
psychological establishments. MDers have reported that their condition is often encountered
with doubt or puzzlement by mental health practitioners (Somer, Somer, & Jopp, 2016b), and
its descriptions and explanations are a matter of dispute (Zepps, 2015).
To this end, we consider and further develop the model proposed by Livnat & Lewin
(2016) - usually employed for the analysis of public political speeches - to explore the rhetorical
maneuvers1, persuasive acts and verbal means used by individuals with daydreaming,
(Maladaptive daydreamers, hence, MDers) to negotiate their viewpoint vis-à-vis claims
emanating from skeptical authorities.
The use of the term “rhetorical maneuvers” follows post-structural thinking and emphasizes the role of language
and discourse in processes of subject positioning.
1
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In this article, we examine the discourse of MDers by analyzing 35 email exchanges
and two petitions submitted to the American Psychiatric Association and to the UK Parliament,
demanding that MD be recognized as a mental disorder. Informed consent and ethics board
approval were recruited. The main research questions are: What type of language do MDers
use to certify their claims? How do they legitimize their subjective experiences and convince
others that MD is a valid condition? In other words, we seek to examine the micro-political
processes of medicalization - the bottom-up reification of MD and how it emerges from “lay”
people’s accounts. By directing attention to the discourse of individuals and their demands for
nosological classification and consequent treatment, we re-examine the social locations of
medical knowledge and highlight the influence-possibilities of “lay” knowledge and its
involvement in the construction of illness.
Maladaptive Daydreaming
The phenomenon of daydreaming is a highly prevalent mental activity experienced by
almost everyone (Singer, 1966). It is thought to encompass almost half of all human thought
(Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010), with hundreds of daydreaming sequences experienced daily
(Klinger, 2009). Maladaptive daydreaming, on the other hand, was first described as an
extensive and distressing fantasy activity that causes dysfunction (Somer, 2002). The
interviewees in Somer’s seminal paper constituted a small clinical sample of socially
withdrawn and functionally impaired individuals who had sought help for dissociative and
personality psychopathology associated with aversive early life experiences. MD seemed to
have initially represented a preference for disengagement from life’s pains by means of moodenhancing fantasies about an idealized self, companionship, intimacy, resourcefulness and
power (Somer, 2002).
Seven years later, the next research publication on MD was a single-case study that
described the successful treatment of excessive daydreaming with 50 mg/day of fluvoxamine,
an antidepressant believed to influence obsessive-compulsive symptoms (Schupak &
Rosenthal, 2009). The authors also reported that “the patient discovered a website containing
a surprising number of anonymous postings on the topic of excessive or uncontrolled
daydreaming. Numerous posters described patterns and tendencies that appeared remarkably
consistent with the patient’s experience” (Schupak & Rosenthal, 2009, p. 291). This report is
the first indication of the grassroots, consumer-driven action culminating in the process we
analyze in this study. That India-based website addressed parenting concerns and featured an
international interactive forum on daydreaming that has been part of a larger section on
children’s behavioral problems (IndiaParenting.com; Jane Bigelsen, personal communication,
March 6, 2016). Apparently, it was on this forum that the 2002 paper was initially mentioned
and where internet users first adopted the term maladaptive daydreaming to communicate with
each other about their nameless condition2.
In 2011, Bigelsen and Schupak retrieved data from members of a MD cyber community
and reported that “a host of online forums and web pages began to proliferate on which
thousands of anonymous posters from around the world professed to have secretly suffered
with these symptoms for years” (Bigelsen & Schupak, 2011, p. 1634). This global interest in
MD was also translated into coverage in the print and electronic media3, which according to
2

IndiaParenting triggered the term’s viral spread on the World Wide Web and the subsequent sprouting of
numerous other online platforms disseminating knowledge about and providing peer-support for MD.
3
Examples include an article in Scientific American (Glausiusz, 2014), a newspaper article in De Standaard, a
Flemish daily newspaper published in Belgium (Le Blanc, 2015), a magazine article in The Atlantic (Bigelsen and
Kelly, 2015), a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation radio show (Tremonti 2015), and articles in Men’s Health
(Bonaguro, 2015), The Wall Street Journal (Reddy, 2016), the Israel daily newspapers Haaretz (Efrati, 2016) and
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Kroll-Smith (2003), has growing significance in creating and conceptualizing medical
phenomena by shaping public perceptions.
In light of broad consumer interest in MD and its wide-ranging media coverage, The
Huffington Post’s online television network, HuffPost Live, aired a scholars’ discussion on
MD (Zepps, 2015) featuring Eric Klinger, Emeritus Professor of Psychology, University of
Minnesota, a leading daydreaming scholar; Scott Barry Kaufman, Scientific Director,
Imagination Institute, University of Pennsylvania; Jayne Bigelsen, a former maladaptive
daydreamer and co-author of several papers on MD; and Eli Somer, an MD scholar. The show
was titled “Is Excessive Daydreaming a Psychiatric Disorder?” and presented substantial
disagreements. Klinger, for example, questioned the classification of MD, saying: “I feel very
uncomfortable about pathologizing it… It is the underlying problem that really is the key here.”
In an interview in the Wall Street Journal, Klinger reiterated his skepticism that MD should be
its own separate mental condition: “I’m very reluctant to create a category for a mindwandering disturbance. Once you start psychopathologizing these things you can get yourself
in trouble, because often normal mechanisms account for this” (Reddy, 2016).
Skeptical views on MD were also voiced by experts in two other prominent news media.
A recent Wall Street Journal story on MD featured Jonathan Schooler, a professor in the
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences at the University of California, Santa Barbara.
Schooler stated:
Whether it deserves its own distinct diagnosis and the degree to which it’s not
just anything more than the extreme end of the distribution of mind-wandering
is not clear to me. Frequent mind-wandering can be a symptom of a variety of
other mental conditions, such as attention-deficit disorders and depression.
(Reddy, 2016)
A CNN report on MD recently quoted clinical psychologist Peter Kinderman of the University
of Liverpool who said, “MD is a good example about wanting to apply the medical disease
model to elements of the human experience… I would not create a new category of mental
disorder for daydreams” (Pequenino, 2016).
After publication of the second and third papers on MD (Bigelsen & Schupak, 2011;
Schupak & Rosenthal, 2009), two major interactive processes ensued: (1) Email traffic from
members of the global MD community to the authors of the three published papers increased.
The writers provided personal testimonies about their MD experiences, requested advice, urged
the authors to promote research on MD and volunteered to take part in future MD research. (2)
Scientific collaboration began between researchers who had independently been writing about
MD: Jayne Bigelsen and her colleagues in the USA and Eli Somer and his research associates
in Israel. This collaboration began with a series of in-depth Skype interviews that examined
the nature of the MD experience (Somer, Somer, & Jopp, 2016a; Somer, Somer, & Jopp,
2016b). It progressed to the development of an MD scale (Somer, Lehrfeld, Bigelsen, & Jopp,
2016) and the presentation of data indicating that MD is a distinct mental disorder (Bigelsen,
Lehrfeld, Jopp, & Somer, 2016)4.
This brief history of MD is characterized by tensions between MDers’ distress on the
one hand and experts’ bafflement on the other and by the interest of the media in this intriguing
the Jerusalem Post (Siegel-Itzkovich 2016), Radio New Zealand’s The Wireless (Kamm 2016), New York
Magazine (Tsoulis-Reay 2016) and CNN (Pequenino, 2016) (sample retrieved from goo.gl/tZMElY on January
6, 2017).
4
The latest developments in this nascent field include the presentation of suggested diagnostic criteria for MD,
the development of a structured clinical interview for MD and the demonstration that it can reliably differentiate
between MDers and non-MDers and a study on the comorbidity of MD.
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mental phenomenon. We described unique grassroots pressure on scholars to reify MD
scientifically. We believe the initial micro-political processes associated with the emergence
of a new psychological disorder are worthy of scientific exploration. In this article we examine
how individuals struggling with an unknown mental condition work to obtain recognition and
legitimization from the medical-scientific establishment.
The Politics of Medical Knowledge
When exploring the core literature on the social aspects of clinical knowledge, one
cannot avoid noticing the dichotomous distinction between the “subjects” and the “objects” of
the “medical gaze” (Conrad, 1992; Foucault, 1973, 1975, 1978; Freidson, 1972; Zola, 1972).
According to these scholars, the ability of modern medicine to name diseases, label and classify
people, and prescribe or proscribe patient behaviors bestows great social power upon
professionals, setting them apart from “lay” people and confirming their greater knowledge
and status. This given authority to define persons, conditions or problems in medical terms can
turn people into objects to be controlled or treated by prevailing forms of knowledge owned by
a few delegated subjects (Conrad, 1992; Conrad & Schneider, 1980; Foucault, 1973, 1975,
1978; Freidson, 1972; Zola, 1972). The dominant medical framework clarifies and explains
what people experience, validates their pain or distress and makes sense of the body (Clarke &
James 2003; Lafrance & McKenzie-Mohr 2013). It identifies treatment options and predicts
outcomes, enables access to services, provides structure to a narrative of dysfunction and also
imposes official order. A diagnosis gives the individual permission to be ill and reflects what
society is prepared to accept as “normal” and what it feels should be treated (Conrad, 1992;
Jutel, 2009).
Still, alongside these suggested modes of objectification by which humans become
subjected to the medical gaze, Foucault (1982) notes that power can also be manifested in
patients’ capacity to resist the attempt to master their forms of knowledge. Thus, power can
also turn them into “subjects” who resist medicine’s monopoly over the right to define health
and illness. Although institutional clinical psychology and medicine remain potent factors in
the day-to-day lives of ordinary people, we are witnessing a permeative process in which the
psycho-medical authorities, with their hierarchical procedures of observation, categorization
or judgment, are now unavoidably being democratized and at times challenged (Conrad, 2005;
Douglas, 2017). This process marks the end of the era of mutual engagement between the
supervisors and the supervised (Bauman, 2000).
These fundamental changes in the organization of medicine are not articulated in a
vacuum, separated from other social concerns. First, we have been witness to a growing distrust
of established experts, which is magnified by our culture’s ambivalent attitude toward the
institutions of science and medicine. Postmodernist perspectives have raised troubling
questions about the role of science in a world stripped of the old warrants of reason and truth
(Lyotard, 1984). Second, in an era characterized by neo-liberal values, “lay” people become
“buyers of health services” or “informed consumers,” while physicians are now regarded as
employees or service providers who are expected to deliver satisfactory work performance.
Under such circumstances, patients are on a more equal footing with their doctors, who are
more prone to acknowledge their limitations and are both aware and critical of the proliferation
of psychiatric categories (Conrad, 1992; Epstein, 2007; Halpin, 2016). Finally, expert
knowledge is now procurable. Information previously restricted to medical authorities is
currently available to “lay” web surfers, who can acquire knowledge and change the way they
experience themselves or grasp the world around them (Conrad & Barker, 2010; Cotten, 2001).
The doctor-patient relationship has become a meeting of experts, with patients more willing to
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challenge their doctors, dispute their findings or seek advice from alternative services outside
the doctor’s office (Lupton, 1997; Nettleton, 2004).
These “educated patients” can also use the web to join advocacy groups that challenge
medical authority, demand a say in how health professionals conceptualize their illness and
battle for recognition or funding (Brown & Zavestoski, 2004; Langdridge, 2016). A growing
number of internet communities form the grounds for social membership and the basis for
staking citizenship claims (Epstein, 2007). These communities offer a means of survival for
sufferers of medically unexplained symptoms and provide alternative networks of support
(Dumit, 2006). They confer collective identity and create their own separate and distinct
medical culture, one that assigns primary importance to the role of subjective experience
(Goldstein, 2004 cited in Jutel, 2009). Furthermore, influential health consumer interest groups
that have developed globally, such as the website of the Britain-based “Experts by Experience,”
provide the NHS, hospitals, universities, professional bodies or third sector organizations with
a range of services with respect to best practices in mental health Experts by Experience, n.d.).
In this new era of distribution of knowledge, it will be interesting to explore the
discourse and resistance practices of MDers when a diagnosis is absent, thus impugning the
medical legitimacy of their complaints. Instead of focusing on large-scale struggle, we use a
micro analysis model to examine the verbal means and rhetorical maneuvers through which
individuals position themselves within the frame of medical discourse and claim recognition
and rights.
Persuasive Acts and Legitimacy Struggles for a New Diagnosis
Clinical psychology and medicine are indeed more likely targets of “lay” intervention
than are other more private and remote domains of scientific practice. It is a site of debate and
critique as long as its implications are relevant to the public and to policy-making (Douglas,
2017). The health of one’s mind and body is an issue of considerable salience to most people,
and there is a substantial history of political struggles around the nature, causes and treatments
of disease (Bury, 1991; Epstein, 1996; Rose, 2001).
According to Epstein (1996), organized groups of patients differ in how they approach
medical discourse. Some groups are essentially negative and distrustful, rejecting medical
knowledge outright and advancing their own claims and different epistemological standpoints.
Others ultimately just want to show that science and truth are on their side, seeking to acquire
the cachet of medical authority for themselves by finding the expert who will validate their
given stance. Other groups try to stake out some ground on the scientists’ own terrain and
wrangle with scientists on issues of truth and method, positioning themselves on the inside as
experts in their own right. In this process of “expertification” they do not devalue scientific
knowledge, but rather seek to re-value knowledge that professional science has excluded
(Epstein, 1996).
For example, Scott (1990) showed how organized “lay” interests frequently play a
significant role in the social construction of disease, as in the case of Vietnam veterans and the
PTSD diagnosis. In the case of PTSD, those with control over classificatory processes needed
to be brought to confront the legitimacy of this mental condition through concerted and
repeated efforts. These efforts, which involved choosing how to speak about the disorder, with
whom to discuss it, when to have those discussions and how to use collective action, eventually
resulted in its inclusion in the DSM-III (Quosh & Gergen, 2008; Scott, 1990).
Brown (2008) argued that defining diseases is often like a turf war, with individuals
and groups with different interests scrambling to establish the authenticity of their claims or of
their expertise. These tensions can be present between laypeople and the representatives of
medical/psychological science. According to Epstein (1996), who explored the unusual
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politicization of AIDS in the United States since the early 1980s, knowledge emerges out of
credibility struggles. Credibility describes the capacity of claims-makers to enroll supporters
behind their arguments, legitimate those arguments as authoritative knowledge and present
themselves as the sort of people who can voice the truth … The credibility of any knowledge
claim can depend on who advances it, who is an “expert” and who is a “layperson,” and what
sort of evidence is invoked to support it (Epstein, 1996).
Latour (1983, 1987) assumed that the process of recognizing new scientific knowledge
and accepting it as true or valid is basically a process of persuasion. He noted that just as
scientists may enroll laypeople in support of scientific facts, so too may laypeople attempt to
enlist scientists to their cause. Thus, the process of medicalization is not simply a result of the
“medical imperialism” of professionals. Patients are not just passive objects of scientific
inquiry but can be active participants in this process (Conrad, 1992).
Language is a crucial resource in the process of persuasion and legitimation of one’s
distress. It is not merely descriptive but also performative, and it bestows power to influence
and construct meaning. According to Van Leeuwen (2009), language is a kind of a tool kit for
performing various social practices. It has a functional aspect and it is recruited for rhetorical
intentions of speakers who wish to accomplish different social goals (e.g., positive selfpositioning in interaction). Thus, Van Leeuwen’s approach - anchored theoretically in systemic
functional linguistics developed by Halliday (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014) - ascribes agency
and capability to individuals and social actors.
What possibilities are there for laypeople to involve themselves meaningfully in the
process of “doing medicine”? How do MDers use language to define the problem at hand and
reinforce their claims? In this article we adopted an analytical model – usually employed to
analyze public political speeches – to explore the linguistic ways in which MDers rhetorically
construct their unrecognized mental health problem for the purpose of persuasion and reality
change. Furthermore, unlike most above-mentioned authors who view the shifts in medical and
institutional power from a macro perspective, emphasizing the role of social movements or
laypeople’s collective actions, in this article we attempt to focus on a less examined
dimension—the individuals and the micro-political processes in their struggle to turn their
suffering into a medical issue. We hope this analysis will shed further light on the conceptual
level of medicalization in the post-modern era.
Study Context
Orit Bershtling: As a scholar of discourse studies I attended a departmental colloquium
presented by Eli Somer on emerging evidence for an unrecognized mental condition he termed
“maladaptive daydreaming.” Beyond the scientific evidence presented, what caught my
attention were his comments on the ongoing discourse he had been holding with countless
individuals from across the world who volunteered information about their distress, sought his
advice and offered their assistance in promoting his research in the field. In initiating this study,
my aim was to explore ways in which individuals struggling with a seemingly obscure mental
health problem interact with a scientist-practitioner who is interested in their condition, in an
attempt to promote curative knowledge.
Eli Somer: Since my first description of MD (Somer, 2002) I have been inundated with
communications from many countries requesting information and guidance about ways of
coping with MD. What had begun as a trickle of messages evolved into a barrage of emails that
had signaled a genuine grassroot appeal to the scientific community to boost research in this
embryonic field. This bottom-up consumer pressure had spurred a number of international
research collaborations that has already resulted in several published papers. Currently, I have
a waiting list of over 700 self-diagnosed MDers who volunteered to take part in future studies.
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This paper is a tribute to countless of persistent sufferers who have added extra drive to my
scientific motivation.
Method
This study aimed to explore one of the crucial uses of language: the process of
legitimation, which stems (in this context) from MDers’ personal experiences in everyday life.
These personal testimonies and acts of persuasion are better captured by means of qualitative
inquiry, grounded theoretically and methodologically in Critical Discourse Analysis. This
method seeks to show how language can be used as an ideological instrument; as a part of the
way that people promote particular ideas, values or views of the world (Denzin & Lincoln,
1994; Johnstone, 2000; Machin & Mayr, 2012).
Data and Participants
We examined the language used by MDers by means of two data sets. The first set
included 35 email exchanges (2010-2016) of MDers (aged 18-63) who had contacted the
second author in response to scientific and media publications on MD and online discussions.
We sampled messages from individuals who included unsolicited statements of interest to
provide personal information for current and future MD research. Some messages also
contained requests for information and advice. These emails arrived from Austria, Argentina,
Brazil, Britain, Egypt, Germany, India, Netherlands, Norway and the USA. Because this was
a retrospective analysis of an existing database, available demographic details were limited.
We also analyzed two submitted petitions. Both appeals demanded recognition of MD as a
mental disorder and were submitted during 2015-2016 to the American Psychiatric Association
(Reed, n.d.) and to the UK Parliament (Petitions, UK Government and Parliament, n.d.).
Ethics
The study was authorized by the institutional ethics committee, and the participants’
full names were substituted by their initials. In line with research on existing datasets, the ethics
committee waived the requirement for informed consent because it was convinced that: (1) The
research involved no risk to the subjects, (2) Participants proactively consented to provide
personal information for MD research, (3) Participant identifying detail was concealed or
deleted, and (4) The waiver would not adversely affect the rights and welfare of the subjects.
Data Analysis
The various texts differed in length and in the chosen ways of representing personal
and family history. Because the petitions addressed a more skeptical audience, they contained
fewer personal descriptions and focused more on figures and quotes of others. Emails
addressed to the MD researchers frequently opened with a personal introduction and proceeded
to describe the course of their condition: when it started; how it developed; the circumstances
associated with its exacerbation; the frequency of its major symptoms; the amount of time
invested in MD; the impact of MD on daily functioning; and descriptions of unsuccessful
attempts to get help. These email messages typically ended with a brief epilogue containing
both a request for information and a plea for help, as well as offers to participate in future
research and assist in promoting MD as a recognized mental condition. Some writers offered
explanations regarding the etiology of their MD, typically utilizing clinical discourse to anchor
it in their early childhoods.
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Beyond the above content analysis, we aimed to explore modes of language use - such
as lexical preferences, ways of justification (e.g., personal stories or statistics), use of pronouns,
adjectives or inclusions - and its rhetorical function in MDers’ effort to convince their target
audiences in the two data sets that MD is a valid condition. In doing so, our premise was that
the process of persuasion contains strategies that foster dialogic interaction with the
interlocutor. In other words, rhetoric serves as a unifying process that unites speaker and
listener and shapes the quality of their relationship. The degree of the elicited emotional
identification generated in the target audience determines the influential power obtained by the
interlocutor (Burke 1969; Perelman 1982). Hence, in our qualitative analysis of the utilized
verbal strategies, we adopted the model suggested by Livnat and Lewin (2016). We sought to
examine whether and how MDers foster interaction with the interlocutors as they try to bring
them closer to their point of view. We also sought to explore whether and how MDers evoke
sympathetic feelings by appealing to shared values and by identifying a common denominator.
In their analysis of verbal strategies, Livnat & Lewin identified three main domains that we
elaborate on below: forming social bonds, building a consensus, and revealing ideology
(2016). Table 1 shows the linguistic strategies and their domains that were pertinent to our
study. Further elaborations are introduced in the findings section.
Table 1. Linguistic strategies and their domains
(The provided illustrations were derived from MDers’ communications)
Domain
Sub-domain
Strategy
1. Forming
Positive speech
Expression of gratitude
social bonds
actions towards
between
the addressee
Expression of praise
interlocutor and
addressee
Informal addressing
Self-disclosure
Disclosure of sensitive
autobiographical information
Disclosure of emotion

2. Building a
consensus

3. Revealing
ideological
position

Building a consensus based
on the recognition of shared
values
Building a common actionoriented denominator
Building a consensus based
on shared knowledge

Building a consensus based
on irony towards a third party
Revealing a position by using
verbs of knowledge and will
Expression of intent

Example
Thanks to you, I now know…
(M.H.)
Sir, you are the father of MD (S.S.)
Thank you even more for your
impressive work (C.A.)
Hi Mr. X
I had a very traumatic, abusive
childhood which led to a lifetime of
loneliness and sadness (B.G.)
MD is ruining my life (J.Z.)
You are my last hope for a decent
life (L.E.)
I have been always very ashamed
(A.A.)
Please help me! (D.D.)
I was so happy to find someone who
understands my condition (S.N.)
All my hair stood up as you started
to describe my struggle (J.W.)
I’m sure I don’t have to explain to
you how frustrating it is (A.L.)
But, as you know, it can be rather
difficult (C.A.)
I play by their rules and take the
pills (Y.B.)
I strongly believe… (M.T.)
I would like to contribute (L.E.)

The Livnat and Lewin model was originally constructed for analyzing political speeches. The
texts we analyzed related to individuals’ efforts to legitimize a yet unrecognized condition that,
in their cases, had often been dismissed or misdiagnosed. We therefore regarded the written
messages as typical rhetorical texts, not unlike political speeches. The following quotes
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represent MDers’ endeavors to convince their interlocutors that their symptoms were real and
similar to those described in published studies or in online MD communities:
I am articulate and able to express myself with confidence (S.J., February 2016).
I’d be a perfect candidate (S.F., December 2015).
You probably receive a lot of emails and it`s understandable that you can`t reply
to all, but I would really appreciate it, if you would be able to, because I feel
that I have nowhere else to turn (B.C., January 2016).
The reason I believe my case could help you get the disorder recognized is
because my entire history of arrests and hospital visits all centered around
maladaptive daydreaming, and there is extensive documentation of a lot of
things that happened (C.A, August 2016).
By describing their attributes (“able to express myself,” “perfect candidate”), their desperation
(“I have nowhere else to turn”) or their well-documented medical history, MDers
communicated their conviction that they meet the MD diagnostic criteria and are entitled to
participate in MD research and receive counseling for their plight.
Trustworthiness
The analysis was performed through two complementary levels: content and form
(modes of language use). This cross-level analysis (triangulation) enabled us to control the
range of interpretations to MDers’ texts and strengthened our findings (Denzin, 1989; Yardley,
2000). Furthermore, the co-operation between two researchers, reading the same texts and
analyzing it together, helped to verify our results.
Results: The Rhetorical Maneuvers of MDers
We divided quotes extracted from MDers’ statements and communications into the
three domains suggested by Livnat and Lewin (2016): forming social bonds, consensus
building, and revealing ideological position. The three domains encompass nine rhetorical
strategies aimed at creating and fostering interlocutor-audience solidarity. Notably, some
participants used a number of linguistic means in parallel. Below we present some prominent
illustrations of these employed strategies.
1. Forming social bonds
Four main verbal strategies illustrate the formation of social bonds between
interlocutor/writer and addressee/reader: expression of gratitude, disclosure of emotion,
disclosure of personal information, and use of humor or irony. MDers applied each of these
strategies to create a sense of closeness to the reader by demonstrating the level of their distress
or by clarifying their willingness to contribute to a common goal: the advancement of future
research in the field as a means of endowing MD with scientific validation.
Expression of gratitude. In their email messages participants tend to start the dialogue
by thanking their interlocutors and creating a bond around a joint effort. I.H. writes: “First off,
I would like to thank you, for giving a name and recognition to something I have been suffering
from for so long without having any proof that it was a thing” (I.H., July 2015).
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Like many other writers, I.H. (who did not disclose her age or place of residence) opens
her text with an expression of gratitude. She thanks the reader for identifying the nameless
symptoms she had been suffering from for so long and for concretizing something that
medically had been so amorphous. That “thing” or that “something,” as she phrases it, evolves
now into a potentially valid diagnosis that can explain her personal distress.
B.G., a 63-year-old American woman, opens her message with a simile and
complements the message of the previous interlocutor:
It was as if I was struck by lightning. For the first time I became aware of the
fact that there were other people who did what I did and I felt somewhat
heartened that I now have a name for this horrible obsession (B.G., June 2016).
The writer thanks the reader for labeling the “obsession” she has been suffering from. She helps
the reader understand the nature of her suffering by describing it as an obsession—a more
familiar disorder. Her choice of words, her use of the adjective “horrible” to describe her
suffering and her comparison of the realization that there were other people with a similar
problem to a lightning strike all add, in line with Gee’s writing (2011), a dramatic effect to her
gratitude and convey the powerful impact of the discovery of MD on her quality of life. The
employment of this communication tactic seems not to diminish the sincerity of her expressed
gratitude; rather, it suggests that the interlocutor employs a parallel rhetorical action. She points
out to the reader that the subject of her gratitude is as important to her as it is to him, thereby
emphasizing their common denominator and enhancing their sense of shared goals (Chilton,
1990).
Disclosure of emotion. The disclosure of emotions can accentuate the message and
help forge the bond between interlocutor and addressee. Expressing emotion enhances intimacy
in the dialogue and narrows the gap between writer and addressee. It is a key in the
legitimization process, because it prepares the audience to accept and support the social actor’s
stance or certain perceptions of reality (Reyes, 2011b).
J.Z., a 20-year-old German student, writes:
MD is ruining my life. It’s always there, every second of the day. It’s like a
parasite in my brain and I just can’t get rid of it. However, when I experience
what I call‚ moments of silence (when suddenly my‚ inner TV shuts off) I am
overcome by a drastic fear and always start crying uncontrollably. It is taking
me apart slowly (J.Z., January 2016).
The writer’s choice of words and images reflects the sense of urgency that accompanies her
distress (“ruining,” “parasite,” “rid of it”). The evocative effect is intensified by the repetitive
emphasis on the frequency with which she experienced the symptoms (“always,” “every
second”), thereby eliciting empathy for her plight (Machin and Mayr, 2012).
Another young woman writes the words “Need help” in her message’s subject line.
This is how she describes her experience:
...Please… please... please... sir give me some clue... how can I overcome this
disorder …….plzz sir I need help........I am only 18 years old.....and a
helpless..... I know this is my last hope......I need some help......I will be waiting
for your kind response (S.S., October 2010).
This excerpt clearly demonstrates how text form underscores text content. The fragmentary
nature of the script, the multiple use of ellipses, the repetitive pleas for help (please=4, help=3),
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the desperate search for a clue to her recovery and the mention of her young age (18) all
enhance the writer’s conveyed sense of vulnerability aimed at evoking the reader’s feelings
and serve as catalysts for swift action (Gee, 2011; Livnat & Lewin, 2016).
To convey their intense distress, writers often employed metaphors to describe their
disengagement from their external worlds and the conflicts associated with their mental habits
(e.g., “the war in my own mind” S.J., February 2016; “I get lost in my head” A.R., May 2016;
“minute to minute struggle” J.W., October 2014). The “war,” “loss” and “struggle” metaphors
evoke emotions that may elicit a mental or behavioral response from the interlocutor (Reyes,
2011b).
Disclosure of personal information.
Imagine this: you are a student, failing your classes because instead of doing
your homework you need to go to the park … simply to daydream on the swing
… and you can’t get help. Why not? Because it’s not an official disorder
(petition submitted to the American Psychiatric Association, Change.org, n. d.).
This excerpt from the petition utilizes another persuasion strategy seemingly aimed at fostering
intimacy with the addressee and at narrowing any gaps between interlocutors and their audience
by means of disclosure of personal accounts designed to reify this elusive, unfamiliar
psychological phenomenon. According to Wodak and Van Leeuwen (1999), the personal
account serves as evidence. It frames the phenomenon in question, providing it with a more
well-defined dimension of time and place. Thus, it helps validate the writers’ state of mind and
justifies the call for recognizing MD as a condition that affects the course and quality of their
lives.
A.A., a 34-year-old Argentinian woman, demonstrates how a personal disclosure
contributes to fostering a bond between the interlocutor and her addressee: “I have been always
very ashamed to even mention them (MD symptoms) to anyone, I felt it was embarrassing and
kept them completely private” (A.A., Aug 2015).
A.A. keeps her MD story secret from her relatives and acquaintances. She feels
embarrassed divulging it to them. In this email she discloses her secret for the first time, thus
transforming the reader into an exclusive confidant and ally and fostering the necessary
bilateral bond (Reyes, 2011a).
Use of humor or irony. 56-year-old A.P.C from Britain and 28-year-old A.R. from the
USA present a fourth verbal strategy for establishing an unmediated connection between writer
and addressee—the use of humor. A.P.C writes: “I sometimes wish I’d done my doctorate in
psychology rather than chemistry! L.O.L” (A.P.C., September 2015). He expresses laughter
and ends his message by wondering about the course of studies he has chosen. A.R. describes
how after writing the letter she is going to waste her time by staring aimlessly at a bottle (“I’m
now off to examine a plastic bottle in awe for several hours!” A.R., May 2016).
According to Ungar (1984), the use of humor serves as an ice breaker. It can blunt
embarrassment associated with the uncovering of personal flaws without tarnishing selfrespect. This strategy neutralizes the reader’s critical nature and intensifies empathic feelings
towards the writer.
2. Building a consensus
A second domain of verbal strategies aimed at persuading an audience and at promoting
solidarity is consensus building. This domain includes three rhetorical strategies that bind
interlocutor and addressee in one common denominator: referring to shared beliefs or values,
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referring to shared knowledge, and partnership and coalition building. These strategies evoke
agreement and subsequently motivate the addressee to take the desired action.
Referring to shared beliefs or values. The attitude towards time in Western capitalist
cultures, which most respondents were part of, is a shared value. The construct of time has
evolved under capitalism into a resource designated to serve a worthy objective. Individuals
are expected to utilize their time resources effectively, make pragmatic decisions concerning
their course of study or career and demonstrate organizational skills, persistence and
responsibility (Marcuse, 1972). Such expectations are reflected in the repeated mention of time
wasted on daydreaming and in the use of time-related metaphors (e.g., “I am running out of
time!!!!” D.M., Nov. 2010). Not only do these metaphors represent cultural values that
associate time and performance, they also transform the abstract idea of time into a more
concrete concept (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). For example, I.H. writes: “Due to maladaptive
daydreaming all the time, days go by where I don’t get any work done” (I.H., June 2016). A.
A. adds: “I could not even calculate the amount of time that I have spent daydreaming” (A.A.,
Aug. 2015).
The performance principle reigns in capitalist societies, and associated rationality, selfdiscipline and the propensity to acquire intellectual, material and experience resources are also
treasured (Marcuse, 1972). Most MDers contrast the real material world with their fantasy
world and link their MD to treading water and underachieving relative to their peers:
… It has affected me a lot; affected my education, my motivation, my personal
relationships. I don’t see any appeal to the real life. I lost all motivation and
ambition …It feels like my life is on hold, and life doesn’t wait for anyone.
People my age are evolving and improving, and I’m here, unable to let go of my
fantasy world to focus on the actual person that I am (I.H., July 2015).
The writers appear to use these shared societal values - the performance principle and the
reverence for time – to legitimize their standpoint. When they comment on their time wasting
or compromised performance as outcomes of MD, they narrow the psychological distance
between them and their addressees, thereby justifying the need for joint action to eradicate the
problem.
Referring to shared knowledge. Another approach to promoting rapprochement and
reducing the hierarchy between writers and readers is associated with the attempt to
demonstrate shared knowledge:
I have a master’s degree in social work, so I am fairly knowledgeable about
mental illness and human behavior. I would be very interested in talking to you
or other professionals about my experience. I believe that there needs to be more
awareness of this problem in order to help people who suffer (J.T., October
2014).
In the excerpt above, J.T., a 48-year-old woman, self-diagnosed with MD, describes her
relevant education and emphasizes her thorough familiarity with the nuances of clinical
discourse. She makes no mention of her own difficulties but rather stresses her willingness to
help others and to contribute from her own knowledge and personal experience. Thus,
legitimization is constructed in her discourse by persuading the audience that her actions will
benefit others (Reyes, 2011b).
36-year-old D.M. also finds a way to show the common knowledge she shares with her
readers: “Unlike your subjects, I have never suffered at the hands of an abuser … Just like your
subjects, I am not married” (D.M., November 2010). It seems as if D.M. negotiates with her
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reader’s accumulated knowledge. She hints that she read one of Somer’s papers, compares her
experiences to those of participants in his past research and advises the reader that the MD
community is probably more heterogeneous than that described in his seminal paper on MD
(Somer, 2002), to include individuals like her who had never experienced childhood trauma.
Most MDers describe a process of self-exploration and a keen wish to learn more about their
troubling condition. They do this by employing clinical discourse, thus exposing their
familiarity with medical and psychological language and vocabulary, a familiarity they tend to
point out. This heeded, thoughtful process presents them as rational and knowledgeable, thus
validating their stance.
The petition submitted to the APA even quoted the medical definition of mental illness
verbatim: “The very definition of mental illness is, and I quote: ‘any of a broad range of medical
conditions’” (Petition written by M.R. to APA). The mentioned medical text is integrated in a
persuasive rhetorical maneuver geared to validate the mental condition of the signatories and
to provide supportive evidence for their potentially contested standpoint. It also produces a
dialogue between equals and moderates likely differences in status (Abell & Myers, 2008).
This is accomplished by presenting the rationale for reparative action and by evoking readers’
empathy and moving them closer to understanding the MDer perspective.
Partnership and coalition building. We identified a third verbal strategy
characterized by the effort to establish an action-oriented coalition.
I am not emailing you to complain. I want to help you in any way I can. I can
research legal implications of the classification of MD as a disorder, or anything
else you would like. I would also be interested in participating in a study (K.B.,
June 2016).
K.B. informally addresses the reader (“Hi Mr. X”) in a message that bears the words “I want
to help” in the subject line. She positions herself in the role of “helper” rather than “helped”
and as an active rather than a passive partner in a campaign to promote public awareness of
MD. K.B. creates a sense of reciprocity in her message. She is not a mere research subject, but
rather possesses unique knowledge of the law, an intellectual resource that complements the
reader’s clinical knowledge. She suggests that she can help the reader expand the knowledge
on MD and implies a benefit for her.
The desired partnership is also advocated as a coalition against a third party. S.F. writes
in an email: “But, armed with your recent article, at least I have something to hand over to a
therapist and say: “ditto for me---sums it up perfectly” (S.F., Dec 2015). Y.B. also assembles
a coalition against his psychiatrists: “Therefore, I am writing to ask for help. Psychiatrists just
throw me in a classical bin (Bipolar I is the diagnostic du jour). I play by their rules and take
the pills” (Y.B., January 2016).
In their messages, S.F., an American attorney, and Y.B., also from the USA, seems to
form a coalition with their readers as they ironically refer to their current therapists. While Y.B.
accepts his psychiatric diagnosis and choses to cooperate with his doctors, S.F. seems to be
more active and plans to confront his incredulous clinician with a paper written by his
addressee. The metaphor in the verb “armed” is infused with a double meaning: by submitting
the paper to his doctor he hopes to secure an accurate diagnosis and better treatment. At the
same time, he seems to want to “fight” his erring therapists with more effective new “weapons”
he acquired from his audience.
In the analyzed discourse we identified an additional approach to coalition building—
the use of the pronoun “we”: “Since we can’t call it disorder, I do believe it’s a coping
mechanism though” (I.H., Jul 2015). By utilizing first person plural, I.H. positions herself close
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to her reader’s viewpoint and establishes a joint reference group with him that is committed to
a common cause (Malone 1997).
3. Revealing ideological position
Finally, the third domain suggested by Livnat and Lewin (2016) concerns the
expression of an ideological or personal stance. We identified two prominent verbal strategies
that reflect this third domain and are employed to persuade the reader to accept the writer’s
arguments: personal evaluation and provided analogies to well-known medical diagnoses.
Evaluation. Evaluation is an act of meaning given to a particular subject. It reveals the
writer’s position on what is regarded as “good” or “bad,” “normal” or “deviant.” Evaluations
encapsulate social presuppositions and involve elements of critique and rationale for action
(Van Leeuwen, 2009). One example of an evaluation that discloses a personal stance is
manifested in the words of S.N., an 18-year old girl from India: “I am completely aware of my
surroundings and can differentiate between reality and a daydream ... I am perfectly normal
(S.N., November 2015). S.N. seems to self-diagnose, while her verbal choices signal high
modality - a high degree of certainty about the evaluation of her mental condition
(“completely”; perfectly”):
S.F. also engages in evaluation of his condition and the onset of his symptoms: “I have
been a fantasizer, dreamer, day dreamer since around age five. My father would always say
jovially: ahh, S.F., you’re a dreamer” (S.F., December 2015). He quotes his father to strengthen
a stance aimed at persuading the reader (Van Leeuwen, 2009). Furthermore, in line with Wodak
and Van Leeuwen’s ideas (1999), by evaluating the course of his condition as long-standing in
duration, S.F. appears to depict it with an “air of objectivity.” His MD began when he was very
young, and it prevails through the present time. In other words, MD has always been a part of
him.
Another example of an evaluation and of revealing an ideological position is embodied
in the message of 18-year-old A.S. from Britain: “I would love to see this phenomenon given
scientific acknowledgement and I would also love to get to the bottom of what has affected me
and evidently thousands of others our whole lives” (A.S., June 2016). A.S. presents her positive
stance towards the study of MD and its hypothesized contribution to the advancement of
knowledge about the phenomenon. Her position is based on prior social assumptions and on
the perception that generating scientific knowledge is essential for understanding any particular
medical problem. Her use of the verb “love” indicates a positive appraisal and connotes her
intention and will to act towards advancing the cause she cherishes. Her justification for action
is also based on the presented prevalence of MD. Her persuasive message and call for action is
empowered by the thousands of MDers she is allegedly speaking for (Van Leeuwen, 2009).
M.T. from the USA also estimates that the number of MD sufferers is large. She uses
the verb “believe” as a seemingly objective rhetorical act aimed at recruiting the reader for
joint action: “And I strongly believe there are a lot of people who suffer from it” (M.T., March
2016).
Analogy to a known medical diagnosis. I.H. draws an analogy between MD and
substance abuse. She uses prior common knowledge about the effects of drug use and relates
to a more familiar social phenomenon. She uses this comparison to render her unfamiliar
symptoms more accessible to her audience:
Another thing I would like to say about MD is that, even though I have never
tried drugs, I think the pleasure it gives is similar to it. I hate how MD messes
up my life, but there is nothing else that gives me as much pleasure as MD. I
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feel a rush of happiness and satisfaction with it. And it’s so addictive … I can
get instant gratification just by daydreaming (I.H., June 2016).
I.H. explains that the immensely rewarding experience of MD is akin to drug use, as
are MD’s negative consequences. To accentuate her analogy, the writer employs verbs of
knowing and evaluation (think, hate) that may underscore her stance and illuminate her daily
experience. These findings are in line with Armentor’s findings (2017) about the ways in which
women with Fibromyalgia – a contested, stigmatized illness – communicate their illness with
others. The women compared Fibromyalgia with a well-known illness, drawing upon existing
knowledge to convince others and help them to understand their personal experiences.
Discussion
The persuasive strategies employed by MDers derive from an interpersonal discourse
aimed at advancing awareness and recognition of MD as a mental health problem. The
illustrations we provided represent the main verbal strategies used by MDers to influence their
interlocutors along three dimensions: (1) the professional dimension—an appeal to the reader’s
professional identity as a scientist-practitioner and the presentation of shared knowledge; (2)
the social dimension—formation of a joint consensus group, coalition or partnership; and (3)
the psychological dimension—an appeal to the reader’s emotions through gratitude, selfdisclosure or humor.
This three-dimensional analysis can organize and enrich our view on the participants’
discursive practices and its functional capacities and highlight the multiple ways in which
individuals can contest medical claims and demand legitimization to their health condition.
Furthermore, our focus on micro-politics—the less explored dimension of the social
construction of disease—complements observations on social movements, widespread political
struggles, collective acts and organizational factors of disease discovery processes After all,
the talk of people as they attempt to make sense of themselves and their distress may draw
together the macro processes of medicalization and can eventually evolve into a venue for
social change and resistance to medical authority. That is, resistance should not be reserved for
visible, collective acts, but rather can be accomplished in smaller-scale dynamics of power and
embodied in everyday-life acts.
The documented rhetorical effort to mobilize the reader reveals the MDers’ active
stances as both a source and an object of medical gaze. Our respondents were neither simply
passive consumers of the medical discourse nor submissive victims of the biomedical machine.
In their quest for a remedy for their unidentified trouble, MDers sought and obtained pertinent
information, disseminated it, showed proficiency in professional terminology and knowledge
in evidence-based medical discourse.
Notably, the interpersonal undercurrents between MDers and members of the scientificprofessional community are atypical. It is usually mental health professionals and academics
who disapprove of the medicalization of daydreaming and the imposition of constructs
borrowed from the medical discourse on the description of excessive daydreaming. In the case
of MD, the tables are turned. As cited in Wall Street Journal (Reddy, 2016), the doctors are
conspicuously those who are reluctant to label a “normal” and prevalent phenomenon
(daydreaming) as psychopathological, dreading the consequences of stigmatic labeling on the
individual. Similarly, as opposed to the research attention that recently has turned to stigma
resistance of people who have been labeled “mentally ill” (Link et al., 2002; Thoits & Link,
2016), MDers strive for a “label,” which will confirm their mental condition.
In other words, a significant part of the difficulties MDers are facing stems from the
fact that they alone cannot produce credible clinical knowledge about effective treatments for
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their condition. To generate clinical recognition and evidence-based treatment for MD medical
knowledge must be jointly created from the mutual nourishing or diffusion of both parties.
MDers and scientist-practitioners need to engage in discourse and jointly produce the texts that
strongly mediate professional activity. Thus, we should examine different social actors and
additional gazes pertinent to the exercise of power (Halpin 2016; Langdridge, 2016). By
acknowledging that medical knowledge is constructed by socially situated claim-makers and
other interested parties, we can bring greater critical awareness to the policy making process.
After all, any policy response to a problem is determined by how the problem is defined or
framed in the first place (Conrad & Barker, 2010).
Self-representations of health and illness offer a strong counterbalance to the dominant
biomedical focus. All knowledge about emotional and physical suffering stems from reports
by individuals seeking remedy and healing (Epstein, 1996). Thus, the origins of all current
diagnoses are rooted in laypersons’ complaints. Therefore, instead of sanctifying individual or
expert ownership of knowledge, we should use the wisdom of crowds and the unique
knowledge retained by community members as well as leverage expert collaboration. This is
the key to developing a new understanding emanating from the intellectual encounter and
bilateral fertilization. As Kroll-Smith (2003) mentioned, those who self-diagnose do not
themselves threaten modern medical authority. Rather, they are exercising, if only
momentarily, an alternative authority, one worth investigating.
References
Abell, J., & Myers, G. (2008). Analyzing research interviews, In R. Wodak & M.
Krzyzanowski (Eds.), Qualitative discourse analysis in the social sciences (pp. 145161). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. doi: 10.1007/978-1-137-04798-4_7
Armentor, J. L. (2017). Living with a contested, stigmatized illness: Experiences of managing
relationships among women with Fibromyalgia. Qualitative Health Research, 27(4),
462-473. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1049732315620160
Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid modernity. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Bigelsen, J., & Kelly, T. (2015). When daydreaming replaces real life: Should elaborate
fantasies be considered a psychiatric disorder? The Atlantic. Retrieved from
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/04/when-daydreaming-replaces-reallife/391319/
Bigelsen, J., Lehrfeld, J. M., Jopp, D. S., & Somer, E. (2016). Maladaptive daydreaming:
Evidence for an under-researched mental health disorder. Consciousness and
Cognition, 42, 254-266. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.03.017
Bigelsen, J., & Schupak, C. (2011). Compulsive fantasy: Proposed evidence of an underreported syndrome through a systematic study of 90 self-identified non-normative
fantasizers. Consciousness and Cognition: An International Journal, 20(4), 1634-1648.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2011.08.013
Bonaguro, A. (2015). How to make your daydreams come true: Letting your mind wander can
help
your
life,
or
hurt
it.
Men’s
Health.
Retrieved
from
http://www.menshealth.com/best-life/wrong-kind-daydreams.
Brown, P. (2008). Naming and framing: The social construction of diagnosis and illness. In P.
Brown (Ed.), Perspectives in medical sociology (pp. 82-103). Long Grove, Ill.:
Waveland Press
Brown, P., & Zavestoski, S. (2004). Social movements in health: an introduction. Sociology of
Health
and
Illness,
26(6),
679–694.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.01419889.2004.00413.x
Burke, K. (1969). A rhetoric of motives. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Orit Bershtling & Eli Somer

1999

Bury, M. (1991). The sociology of chronic illness: A review of research and prospects.
Sociology of Health and Illness, 13, 451-468. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.14679566.1991.tb00522.x
Change.org. (n. d.). Help maladaptive daydreaming be officially recognized as a mental
disorder/illness. Retrieved from https://www.change.org/p/american-pyschiatric-helpmaladaptive-daydreaming-be-officially-recognized-as-a-disorder.
Chilton, P. (1990). Politeness, politics and diplomacy. Discourse & Society, 1(2), 201-224.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926590001002005
Clarke, J., & James, S. (2003). The radicalized self: The impact on the self of the contested
nature of the diagnosis of chronic fatigue syndrome. Social Science & Medicine, 57(8),
1387–1395. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0277-9536(02)00515-4
Conrad, P. (1992). Medicalization and social control. Annual Review of Sociology, 18, 209232. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.so.18.080192.001233
Conrad, P. (2005). The shifting engines of medicalization. Journal of Health and Social
Behavior, 46(1), 3-14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002214650504600102
Conrad, P., & Barker. K. K. (2010). The social construction of illness: Key insights and policy
implications. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 51(1_suppl), 67-79.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022146510383495
Conrad, P., & Schneider, J. (1980). Deviance and medicalization: From badness to sickness.
St. Louis, MO: Mosby Company
Cotten, S. (2001). Implications of internet technology for medical sociology in the new
millennium.
Sociological
Spectrum,
21(3),
319–40.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/027321701300202019
Denzin, N. K. (1989). The research act (3rd ed.). Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.). (1994). Handbook of qualitative research. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Douglas, H. (2017). Science, values, and citizens. In M. P. Adams, Z, Biener, U. Feest, & J. A.
Sullivan (Eds.), Eppur si muove: Doing history and philosophy of science with Peter
Machamer, The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, 81, 83-96.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52768-0_6
Dumit, J. (2006). Illnesses you have to fight to get: Facts as forces in uncertain, emergent
illnesses.
Social
Science
and
Medicine,
62(3),
577–90.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2005.06.018
Efrati, I. (2016). Researchers: Maladaptive daydreaming can become a psychiatric disorder.
Haaretz [Country]. Retrieved from http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/science/.premium1.2944729.
Epstein, S. (1996). Impure science: AIDS, activism and the politics of knowledge. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.273.5277.860e
Epstein, S. (2007). Inclusion: The politics of difference in medical research. Chicago, IL: The
University
of
Chicago
Press.
http://dx.doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226213118.001.0001
Experts by Experience. (n.d.). EbyE, Experts by Experience. Retrieved from
https://expertsbyexperience.wordpress.com
Foucault, M. (1973). The birth of the clinic. New York, NY: Vintage Books.
http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203406373
Foucault, M. (1975). Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. Vintage Books, New York.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/9780822390169-018
Foucault, M. (1978). The history of sexuality. New York, NY: Vintage Books.
Foucault, M. (1982). The subject and power. Critical Inquiry, 8(4), 777–795.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/448181

2000

The Qualitative Report 2018

Freidson, E. (1972). Profession of medicine: A study of the sociology of applied knowledge.
New York, NY: Dodd, Mead and Company.
Gee, J. P. (2011). How to do discourse analysis: A toolkit. New York, NY and London, UK:
Routledge.
Glausiusz, J. (2014). Living in an imaginary world. Scientific American – Mind. Retrieved from
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/living-in-an-imaginary-world/.
Halliday, M. A. K., & Matthiessen, C. M. I. M. (2014). An introduction to functional grammar.
New York, NY: Taylor & Francis.
Halpin, M. (2016). The DSM and professional practice: Research, clinical and institutional
perspectives. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 57(2), 153-167.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022146516645637
Johnstone, B. (2000). Qualitative methods in sociolinguistics. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Jutel, A. (2009). Sociology of diagnosis: A preliminary review. Sociology of Health & Illness,
31(2), 278-299. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9566.2008.01152.x
Killingsworth, M., & Gilbert, D. T. (2010). A wandering mind is an unhappy mind. Science,
330(6006), 932. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1192439
Klinger, E. (2009). Daydreaming and fantasizing: Thought flow and motivation. In K. D.
Markman, W. M. P. Klein, & J. A. Suhr (Eds.), Handbook of imagination and mental
simulation
(pp.
225-239).
New
York,
NY:
Psychology
Press.
http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203809846.ch15
Kroll-Smith, S. (2003). Popular media and ‘excessive daytime sleepiness: A study of rhetorical
authority in medical sociology.’ Sociology of Health & Illness, 25(6), 625–643.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9566.00362
Lafrance, M., & McKenzie-Mohr, S. (2013). The DSM and its lure of legitimacy, Feminism &
Psychology, 23, 119-140. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959353512467974
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago, IL: The University of
Chicago Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226470993.001.0001
Langdridge, D. (2016). Recovery from heart attack: Biomedicalization and the production of a
contingent health citizenship. Qualitative Health Research, 27(9), 1-11.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1049732316668818
Latour, B. (1983). Give me a laboratory and I will raise the world. In K. D. Knorr-Cetina & M.
Mulkay (Eds.). Science observed: Perspectives on the social study of science (pp. 141170). London, UK: Sage.
Latour, B. (1987). Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Le Blanc, N. (2015). Dagdromen: Als de fantasie op hol slaat [Daydreaming: When
imagination runs wild]. De Standaard [The Standard]. Retrieved from
http://www.pressreader.com/belgium/destandaard/20150219/282333973348018/TextView.
Link, B. G., Struening, E. L., Neese-Todd, S., Asmussen, S., & Phelan, J. C. (2002). On
describing and seeking to change the experience of stigma. Psychiatric Rehabilitation
Skills, 6(2), 201–31.
Livnat, Z., & Lewin, B. A. (2016). The interpersonal strand of political speech. Language &
Dialogue, 6(2), 275-305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/ld.6.2.04liv
Lupton, D. (1997). Consumerism, reflexivity and the medical encounter. Social Science and
Medicine, 45(3), 373-381. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0277-9536(96)00353-X
Lyotard, J. F. (1984). The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge. Minneapolis, MA:
University of Minnesota Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511570940.003
Machin, D., & Mayr, A. (2012). How to do critical discourse analysis? London, UK: Sage.

Orit Bershtling & Eli Somer

2001

Malone, M. (1997). Worlds of talk: The presentation of self in everyday conversation.
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Marcuse, H. (1972). Eros and civilization. London, UK: Abacus.
Nettleton, S. (2004). The emergence of e-scaped medicine. Sociology, 38(4), 661-679.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0038038504045857
Petitions, UK Government and Parliament. (n.d.). More research into maladaptive
daydreaming. Retrieved from https://petition.parliament.uk/archived/petitions/62832.
Pequenino. K. (2016, December 30). Maladaptive daydreaming: When fantasies become
a nightmare.
CNN.
Retrieved
from http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/30/health/maladaptive-daydreamingfeature/index.html
Perelman, C. (1982). The realm of rhetoric. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Quosh, C., & Gergen, K. J. (2008). Constructing trauma and its treatment: Knowledge, power
and resistance. In K. J. Gergen, T. Sugiman, W. Wagner & Y. Yamada (Eds.), Meaning
in action: Constructions, narratives, and representations (pp. 97-111). Tokyo, Japan:
Springer. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-74680-5_6
Reed, C. (n.d.). Legally recognize maladaptive daydreaming as a mental disorder. Retrieved
from https://www.change.org/p/american-psychiatric-association-legally-recognizemaladaptive-daydreaming-as-a-mental-disorder.
Reddy, A. (2016, May 9). When daydreaming becomes a problem. Wall Street Journal.
Retrieved from https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-daydreaming-becomes-a-problem1462818328 .
Reyes, A. (2011a). Palin vs. Biden: The right for credibility in political discourse. Issues in
Political Discourse Analysis, 3(1), 75-94.
Reyes, A. (2011b). Strategies of legitimization in political discourse: From words to actions.
Discourse & Society, 22(6), 781-807. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0957926511419927
Rose, N. (2001). The politics of life itself. Theory, Culture and Society. 18(6), 1-30.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781400827503
Schupak, C., & Rosenthal, J. (2009). Excessive daydreaming: A case history and discussion of
mind wandering and high fantasy proneness. Consciousness and Cognition, 18(1), 290292. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2008.10.002
Scott, W. (1990). PTSD in DSM-III: A case in the politics of diagnosis and disease. Social
Problems, 37(3), 294-310. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/800744
Siegel-Itzkovich, J. (2016). Studies identify disorder of ‘maladaptive daydreaming.’ Jerusalem
Post. Retrieved from http://www.jpost.com/Business-and-Innovation/Health-andScience/Studies-identify-disorder-of-maladaptive-daydreaming-453983.
Singer, J. L. (1966) Daydreaming. New York, NY: Random House.
Somer, E. (2002). Maladaptive daydreaming: A qualitative inquiry. Journal of Contemporary
Psychotherapy, 32(2), 197-212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1020597026919
Somer, E., Lehrfeld, J., Bigelsen, J., & Jopp, D. S. (2016). Development and validation of the
maladaptive daydreaming scale (MDS). Consciousness and Cognition, 39, 77-91.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.12.001
Somer, E., Somer, L., & Jopp, D. S. (2016a). Parallel lives: A phenomenological study of
people struggling with maladaptive daydreaming. Journal of Trauma and Dissociation
39, 77-91. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.12.001.
Somer, E., Somer, L., & Jopp, D. S. (2016b). Childhood antecedents and maintaining factors
in maladaptive daydreaming. Journal of Mental and Nervous Disease, 204(6), 471-478.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/NMD.0000000000000507
Thoits, P. A., & Link, B. G. (2016). Stigma resistance and well-being among persons in
treatment for psychosis. Society and Mental Health, 6(1), 1–20.

2002

The Qualitative Report 2018

Tremonti, A. M. (2015). Maladaptive daydreaming, a debilitating condition with no escape
[Radio program]. In S. Grant’s, The Current. Toronto, CA: CBC. Retrieved from.
http://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-june-9-20151.3105683/maladaptive-daydreaming-a-debilitating-condition-with-no-escape1.3105713.
Tsoulis-Reay, A. (2016, Oct. 12). What it’s like when your daydreams are just as real as life.
New York Magazine.
Ungar, S. (1984). Self-mockery: An alternative form of self-presentation. Symbolic Interaction,
7(1), 121-133. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/si.1984.7.1.121
Van Leeuwen, T. (2009). Discourse as the recontextualization of social practice: A guide. In
R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), Methods of critical discourse analysis (pp. 144-161).
London, UK: Sage. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195323306.003.0001
Wodak, R., & Van Leeuwen, T. (1999). Legitimizing immigration control: A discoursehistorical
analysis.
Discourse
Studies,
1,
83-118.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1461445699001001005
Yardley, L. (2000). Dilemmas in qualitative health research. Psychology & Health, 15, 215228.
Zepps, J. [SomerClinic]. (2015, May 4). Is excessive daydreaming a psychiatric disorder?
[Video
file].
Retrieved
from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9qpWvJ0mq6w
Zola, I. (1972). Medicine as an institution of social control. Sociological Review, 20(4), 487504. ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.1972.tb00220.x
Author Note
Orit Bershtling, Ph.D., a social worker at the Ministry of Health, Israel. She is an
adjunct lecturer at the School of Social Work, University of Haifa & Tel Aviv University,
Israel. Correspondence regarding this article can be addressed directly to:
o.bershtling@gmail.com.
Eli Somer, Ph.D., clinical psychologist, is former president of both the international and
the European societies for trauma and dissociation. He is faculty at the School of Social Work
and director, International Consortium for Maladaptive Daydreaming Research, University of
Haifa, Israel. Correspondence regarding this article can also be addressed directly to:
somer@research.haifa.ac.il.
Copyright 2018: Orit Bershtling, Eli Somer, and Nova Southeastern University.
Article Citation
Bershtling, O., & Somer, E. (2018). The micro-politics of a new mental condition:
Legitimization in maladaptive daydreamers’ discourse. The Qualitative Report, 23(8),
1983-2002. Retrieved from https://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol23/iss8/14

